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Abstract  
Nigeria’s emergence as a player on the international theatre heralded 
myriad hope for the African continent. Consequently, Nigeria’s 
debut in the seemingly anarchical international system (I.S) was 
fastened to a philosophical praxis that centered unmistakably on 
African interests and values. However, findings in extant literature 
indicate that Nigeria has not gained commensurably in predisposing 
her international relations to be conditioned primarily by African 
interests and values. With the theoretical binoculars of the 
Constructivist Theory, and adopting the specific cases of Nigeria’s 
bilateral relations with Angola, South Africa and Ghana, this study 
investigates the gains and costs of contriving Nigeria’s International 
Relations (N.I.R) to be essentially based on African values and 
interests. The paper argues that ‘African values and interests’ as a 
philosophical praxis may have favoured Nigeria considerably in 
other domains but not in her International Relations (I.R); as indeed, 
“she gave and gave and in return got nothing”. The study does not 
only recommend the pressing need of dismantling, overhauling and 
reinventing the philosophical foundations of Nigeria’s I.R (as this 
has been proposed by some extant studies) but also the engagement 
of policies that ensure that the country recovers all she lost in her 
years of naivety in I.R. The study adopted the historical 
methodology which emphasizes critical analyses and interpretation 
of facts. Data for the study came largely through secondary sources 
and a few primary sources in the form of Government documents 
and confidential reports. 
 
Introduction 
The emergence of Nigeria in 1960 as a sovereign state with all the 
trappings of a modern state and potentials of greatness qualified her 
for full membership of the International System (I.S), wherein the 
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seemingly squalid business of International Relations (I.R) is 
conducted. Nigeria consummated her sovereignty by becoming the 
99th member of the United Nations – the fulcrum of contemporary 
I.R, on October 7, 1960 (Gambari, 187). From the outset, Nigerian 
policy – makers made it clear that independence would amount to 
little or nothing; except it was employed to pursue the aim of further 
decolonization of the continent. This resolve was boldly projected in 
the maiden address of Nigeria at the 15th regular session of the 
United Nations General Assembly where the late Prime Minister, Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa articulated the broad principles of 
Nigeria’s international relations. Among other principles, the Prime 
Minister declared inter alia that African values and interests would 
serve as the anchorage of Nigeria’s I.R. Consequently, and on the 
basis of African values and interests, Nigeria swore to assist in the 
eradication of Apartheid in South Africa and the promotion of 
responsible independence for those African countries still under 
colonial domination on the continent.  
It must be understood that this lofty aim was conditioned 
partly by the wave of Pan – Africanism in the world and especially, 
the contribution of Nigeria’s leaders to that cause, particularly, the 
doyens of Nigerian nationalism, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo. Presenting his inaugural address on the occasion 
of Nigeria’s independence and his installation as the Africa’s first 
indigenous Governor – General, Dr. Azikiwe averred: 
 
The challenge of Nigeria as a Free State in the 
twentieth century Africa is the need to revive the 
stature of man in Africa… we cannot concede that it 
is in our national interest to fraternize with such 
nations which practise race prejudice and we must 
not acquiesce in such an outrageous insult on the 
black man. In fact, we must regard it as a mark of 
disrespect and an unfriendly act if any country with 
whom we have friendly relations indulge in race 
prejudice in any shape or form, no matter how it 
may be legally cloaked. (Azikiwe, 8) 
 
With the above framework, subsequent Nigerian governments 
considered Nigeria’s international relations to be founded on the 




‘immoveable rock’ of African values and interests and proceeded to 
exert enormous financial, political and ideological energies for the 
betterment of the African continent. Nigeria’s role was so central to 
the struggle against Apartheid that the United Nations allowed her to 
serve for up to twenty years as Chairman of the United Nations 
Special Committee against Apartheid (Gambari, 189). South Africa 
was also to declare Nigeria a frontline state, in acknowledgement of 
Nigeria’s crucial crusading struggles against Apartheid (Otubanjo, 
78). Elsewhere in Angola, Nigeria doled out millions of dollars to 
support that country’s liberation struggles. Several other instances 
abound to buttress the commitment of Nigeria to Africa - her values 
and interests.  
How far this international relations trajectory has helped 
Nigeria in the achievement of her national interest has become a 
great debate in Nigeria’s foreign policy and I.R discourses. Thus, the 
statement of this study’s problem may simply read: ‘African values 
and interests’ as a philosophical praxis may have favoured Nigeria 
considerably in other domains but not in her International Relations 
(I.R). This is because in formulating foreign policy objectives, every 
state makes an analytic distinction between interests which are 
critical to its very existence and those that are not. The first group is 
called vital interests, while the second group is called secondary 
interests (Ade - Ibijola, 566). It would appear that Nigerian policy 
makers over the years mistook the country’s secondary interests for 
its vital interests. 
However, to provide a balanced assessment of the problem, 
an investigation of the gains and costs of contriving Nigeria’s 
International Relations (N.I.R); based on African values and 
interests is made in the study; specific case studies of Nigeria 
bilateral relations with Angola, South Africa and Ghana is adopted. 
For ease and convenience, the study is divided into six sections. This 
introduction is directly followed by the conceptual and theoretical 
framework. The third section essays on African values and interests 
as philosophical foundations of Nigeria’s I.R. The fourth part 
discusses the gains of African values and interests as enablers of 
N.I.R. The penultimate sections x – rays the costs of African values 
and interests on N.I.R. The study is concluded in the sixth part 
which also contains the recommendations. 




Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
Values have been seen as the ideas that propel man’s daily actions; 
they are the standards which members of the community adhere to in 
their personal and communal interaction towards the achievement of 
the goals (Igboin, 98). In a sense, values refer to what is ‘good’ or 
‘desired’. Put differently, values refer to the usefulness or 
worthwhileness of anything. By extension, African values showcase 
the worthwhileness of Africa and Africans.  
But we should not delude ourselves to believe that African 
values mean one and the same thing throughout Africa. At best, the 
term African values is a motley of issues from which the African 
way of life can be appreciated. These issues include: (i) Sense of the 
sacredness of life;  (ii)Sense of hospitality and philanthropy; (iii) 
Sense of community life and brotherliness;  (iv)Sense of good 
human relations;  (v) Sense of the sacred and of religion; (vi) Sense 
of time; (vii) Sense of respect for authority and the elders; (viii) 
Sense of language and proverbs and the like.African values appear to 
have been summed in one single concept – the concept of African 
Personality. This is because according to Alex Quaison – Sackey the 
African Personality is: 
 
In the largest sense, the cultural expression of what 
is common to all peoples whose home is on the 
continent of Africa. the fact that the great majority 
of these people have black skin is, to be sure, 
important but of greater importance is the fact that 
the African Personality – by attempting to transcend 
its specific physical and intellectual environment, 
yet without pulling up the roots that nourish it – 
hopes to create as a force for world peace and unity, 
a dynamic political creed. Such a creed will express 
itself through that personality which embraces the 
qualities of man as a citizen of Africa and as a 
member of the human race (Quaison – Sackey, 35). 
What can be gleaned from the above remarks is that the ultimate aim 
of African values is to restore the dignity of Africa and the African. 
Lastly, African values have been influenced by two significant 
external phenomena – Islam and Western cultures.  Often, the 




principles animating these external influences conflict with each 
other and also with the traditional African values. “What is to be 
done”, writes Nkrumah (73) “is that the two external influences must 
be accommodated only as experiences of the traditional African 
society”. “If we fail to do this” Nkrumah (73) concludes, “our 
society will be racked by the most malignant schizophrenia”. 
African interests on the other hand, refer to the finding of 
solutions to a plethora of challenges that confront the continent.  
Students and scholars of International Relations would not but agree 
that the interests of a people are not static but dynamic. African 
interests have transmuted from asserting the African Personality, 
decolonization to security and development among others. 
Lastly on conceptual framework, international relations is to 
be distinguished from International Relations. The former refers to 
the multifarious relationships between and amongst sovereign states 
and other actors on the international stage. The later implies a study 
of the former i.e. the study of the multifarious relationships between 
and amongst sovereign states and other actors on the international 
stage. Often, international relations is taken as co - terminable with 
such terms as foreign policy and diplomacy; although, this fusion 
would appear unwieldy in a meta – critical discourse. Foreign policy 
refers to a set of programmes pursued by a state in relations with 
other states. Diplomacy serves as the conduit or machinery for 
implementing the stated objectives of state. In this discourse, the 
terms international relations and foreign policy are often used co – 
terminably.  
This study requires a theoretical framework and hence, the 
Constructivist Theory is evaluated and used. The constructivist 
theory traces its root to the pioneering work of Nicholas Onuf, 
Richard K. Ashley and Alexander Wendt (Ugwuja, Ibekilo and 
Ekesiobi, 17). Constructivism primarily seeks to show how 
international relations (wherein foreign policy is anchored) is 
constructed. Constructivism holds that it is ideas and not realities 
that inform the decision of sovereign states. The theory attempts to 
explain how the historical and social formations of a country create 
ideas which are often interpreted as realities in international relations 
(Griffiths, 52). Alexander Wendt who is by far the most vocal 
enunciator of this theory maintains that “anarchy is what states make 
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of it” (Wendt, 385).Constructivism considers international politics as 
a sphere of interaction which is shaped by the actor’s identities and 
practices and also influenced by constantly changing normative 
institutional structures. It maintains that states’ goals, either material 
or (objective goals) such as security and economic development or 
immaterial or (subjective goals) such as international recognition 
and prestige are generated by their social corporate identities or how 
they view themselves or other actors in international politics. 
The basic assumption of the constructivist theory may be 
rendered into the following: 
(1) States are the principle units of analysis for international 
political enquiry 
(2) State identities and interest are constructed primarily based 
on perception rather than reality. 
(3) The key structures in the state system are inter-subjective 
rather than material(Ugwuja, Ibekilo and Ekesiobi, 17). 
 
Applying this theory to this present study, one can argue that the 
promptings for and reliance on African values as the philosophy of 
Nigeria’s I.R  has been a mere reflection of our corporate identities 
and self- perception rather than concrete political and economic 
realities, especially, the later. It cannot be argued that at 
independence Nigeria saw herself as a “giant” by virtue of its 
stupendous resources, endowments and population. Nigeria therefore 
constructed a foreign policy which feeds more on self- perception 
rather than on concrete political reality. This explains why her 
philanthropic gestures were made without much cost and benefit 
analysis. 
Although, constructivism as a theory explicates Nigeria’s 
foreign policy lacuna, it is not without inherent weaknesses. For one, 
we know that is a state –centric/real politik orientated theory that 
tends to neglect the influence/impact of other actors of international 
relations. 
Philosophical Foundations of Nigeria’s International Relations: 
The African Values and Interests Nexus 
Until recently, very little scholarly attention was given to the 
philosophical foundations of Nigeria’s international relations. Most 
scholars of International Relations assumed that philosophical 
enquiries in such a heady discipline as International Relations were 




extraneous. L.A Jinadu provides apt insight into this lacuna when he 
submits that “the neglect of the interface between philosophy and 
foreign policy is not peculiar to our study of Nigeria’s external 
relations or international relations. It applies equally to our study of 
domestic public policy”. (18) 
Furthermore, Jinadu avers: 
 
The reason for this lacuna in our intellectual works 
emanates from the fact that our mainstream 
methodological perspective confer on structure and 
by extension, process, since structure implies 
process as a reference the ecology of public policy 
or public administration, the critical even casual 
determinant of public policy. While we confer 
autonomy on structure in shaping policy, we tend to 
regard ideas, in the form of moral and political 
philosophy, as “epiphenomenal” (18). 
 
Perceptions of the ‘external reality’ and how to respond to it – the 
substance of I.R – are influenced by the world views of individuals, 
by the purpose and ends of government and by what needs to be 
done to pursue collective development. “These” writes, Jinadu “are 
philosophical issues which invariably provide the ideational context 
for determining policy programmes and objectives”.  It is to be noted 
that every policy /activity starts from an idea. Thus, subjecting 
policies to philosophical scrutiny would certainly sieve the 
irrelevancies from policies and thus enhance their achievability. This 
cannot be claimed to have wholly been the case vis ả vis Nigeria’s 
foreign policy and I.R. 
The above viewpoints should not be misconstrued to suggest 
that Nigeria’s foreign policy have no philosophical connotations. 
The point is that as a critical scrutiny of the wisdom inherent in the 
choice of certain international relations engagements of Nigeria, 
philosophy has had little consultation. The following issues have 
functioned as the basis of Nigeria’s I.R: (i) Decolonization of the 
African continent; (ii) leadership of the African continent; (iii) self-
determination and self-government; (iv) non – alignment; 
(v)internationalism/inter – dependence; (vi) removal of the global 
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asymmetric order; (vii) economic development among others. From 
these, one can see the imprints of African values and interests on 
Nigeria’s I.R. 
 
An Appraisal of the Gains of African Values and Interests as 
Actuators of Nigeria’s I.R 
In most extant literature on Nigerian foreign policy and international 
relations, Nigeria’s predication of her I.R on African values praxis is 
often criticized as having had no strategic or developmental value 
for the country. This is not always the case; indeed, African values 
and interests as basis for Nigeria’s I.R served a useful purpose at a 
particular period in the history of the country; when she needed to 
assert herself on the African continent. From whatever angle we look 
at it, especially, in the 1970’s, we can assuredly notice that it helped 
to boost Nigeria’s image in not only her African international 
relations but indeed the global theatre.  
Unarguably, a country’s external image is an important 
aspect in its international relations. The United States of America 
and some European states that prod other states on the international 
stage are able to so, because of an intimidating image they have 
garnered over the years. In any case, Nigeria’s image soared in the 
world consequent upon the enunciation of the principle of African 
values and interests as the ‘center piece’ of her foreign policy. As 
stated elsewhere in this study, Nigeria made it clear that her 
independence would amount to nothing if some parts of Africa were 
still under colonialism. Hassan Saliu writes that “massive material 
and human resources were placed at the disposal of liberation 
movements” (226). Nigeria was not intimidated by the fact that the 
Western world, being essentially the colonizers, would collide with 
her in their relentless pursuit of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
Furthermore, Hassan Saliu notes that “the Murtala administration 
promptly recognized the MPLA and geared up material and 
diplomatic support for the party. The granting of a financial aid of 
$20 million climaxed Nigeria’s support for the party” (231) 
What is more, the policy of nationalization of the assets of 
BP in Shell-BP taken in July 1979 by the Obasanjo regime over the 
issue of Rhodesian independence complimented the Angolan policy 
to promote a good image for Nigeria (Saliu, 236). Perhaps more than 
this, Nigeria’s moral and anti- apartheid stance was instrumental to 




her recognition as a clear leader on the African continent in the 
1970s. Nigeria’s concern for the political struggle of South Africa - 
earned her a well-deserved membership of the frontline states of 
Southern Africa (Garba, 111). 
The sum total of all this, according to Joseph Garba revealed 
themselves in 1977, when Nigeria against all odds secured the 
African non-permanent UN-Security Council seat at the expense of 
Niger (77). Nigeria’s African foreign policy afforded Nigeria 
leadership of all blacks all over the world as many of them came to 
identify with Nigeria. “Indeed the history of the second black 
Festival of Arts & Culture (FESTAC) in 1977 in Lagos, rekindled 
the interest of blacks all over the world and promoted the goal of 
pan-Africanism” (Garba, 92).  In contemplation of the foregoing vis 
ả vis the gains of Nigeria’s Africa foreign policy in the 20th century, 
Hassan Saliu reports that; 
 
Nigerians visiting other countries were proud of 
the respect they enjoyed. Apparently informed 
of the country’s oil wealth and influence, many 
nations believed that Nigerians were going to 
contribute positively to their national 
economies. Nigeria was the target of 
international financial institutions which had 
excess money to lend to the country due to her 
economic viability (Saliu, 226). 
 
 Furthermore, Hassan Saliu informs us that: 
 
The country, Nigeria’s financial suitors 
propounded the thesis of under borrowing  in their 
judgment, the debt overhang of Nigeria, which 
until  1978 was computed in millions, qualified her 
as an under borrowed country. Her minerals and 
human resources could sustain a bigger debt   
figure (Saliu, 226). 
 
The usefulness of Nigeria’s Africa policy derives from the saying 
that a good name is better than riches. Without doubt, Nigeria’s 
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Africa policy projected Nigeria and enhanced her image throughout 
the globe, especially, in the 1970s. Nonetheless, several 
disadvantages arise and continue to do so as result of basing 
Nigeria’s I.R on African values and interests. This is given attention 
in the following section. 
 
The Costs of Basing Nigeria’s International Relations on Africa 
Values and Interests: The Case of Angola 
Nation states all over the world fashion their foreign policy to guide 
external relations, as well as to protect, promote and defend their 
vital national interests of which promotion of economic viability is 
paramount. It is, therefore, naturally expected that at any point in 
time, Nigeria’s international relations as captured in the foreign 
policy should be a reflection of the aspirations for the well- being of 
the ordinary Nigerian, because as stated earlier, a country’s foreign 
policy is a reflection of the domestic policy. How far Nigeria’s 
Africanist policy of the 20th century succeeded in bettering the lives 
of the generality of Nigerians is not so much an academic question 
for even the blind could see that we gained little (compared with 
what was lost).  
A study of the various engagements made by Nigeria within 
the confines of a foreign policy/ international relations powered by 
african values and interests such as decolonization of the continent, 
Peace- keeping missions, bilateral and multilateral financial aid to 
African states shows that Nigeria’s Africa foreign policy philosophy 
does not appear to be well- aligned to the country’s core national 
interests. Simply put, Nigeria Africa foreign policy has not served 
the national interest in a commensurate measure. Let us start with 
Nigeria’s misdeeds in Angola.   
After several centuries of colonial exploitation of Angola 
and a brutally disarticulated economy based on cassava, the 
Portuguese, owing to the wind of change and militant agitations of 
their colonies announced their withdrawal from Angola come 
November 11th, 1975. Meanwhile, three political parties – MPLA, 
FNLA and UNITA had become ferociously entangled in a deadly 
contest for the leadership of the soon – to – be – independent 
Angola. While other African states weighed the evolving crisis from 
the standpoint of their national interests, Nigeria without weighing 
the pros and cons of the matter and believing it reflected more 




African values to give without thinking declared support for the 
MPLA; majorly because the West were sponsoring the rival factions. 
No reciprocal agreement(s) were made with the Angolans on the 
assistance offered by Nigeria. Joe Garba writes that: 
 
Once we accorded recognition, things moved with 
what came to be thought of as Murtala – esque 
speed. An outright grant of twenty million dollars 
was made to the MPLA Government; military 
hardware from rifles to MiGs, supplies from 
clothing to composite rations, were sent in ever 
increasing quantities. Nigeria’s “radicals” and 
slumbering political correspondents had a field day, 
and anyone particularly in the foreign ministry 
whose perspective went beyond dramatic effect in 
the immediate days ahead, and who asked about a 
quid pro quo for Nigeria’s lavish support was 
derisively overridden… now here was twenty 
million dollars in cash going to Angola without a 
discussion even what might gain, or even what uses 
it would be put to (Garba, 23 -26). 
 
The financial aid to Angola has borne no reciprocal fruits 
whatsoever. Joe Garba who was Nigeria’s external affair 
commissioner in 1975 later saw the uselessness of such a gesture. He 
regrets that two years later, that is by 1977 “no one could pin down a 
normal Angola to any form of bilateral agreement’’. In the opinion 
of the present researcher, the Angolan government and people have 
only (both in the past and now) repaid the Nigeria people that bore 
the ransom for their nationhood with evil. The Africanist 
philanthropic gesture did not stop at the twenty million dollars grant, 
indeed, all manners of assistance were rendered including housing, 
releasing several Nigerian aircrafts to Angola. Indeed, when Angola 
was stable to run their own aviation industry, they obstinately 
refused to have flights from Luanda to Lagos; Nigerians who wished 
to travel to Angola had to fly first to Portugal before moving to 
Angola. 
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In fact, to the Angolans, Nigeria was only a “father 
Christmas” with a big load of goodies. Despite all Nigeria did for 
Angola, Nigeria’s name was conspicuously absent from the list of 
the countries Angola paid tribute to, for assisting them in their 
independence struggle at their  first appearance at the  O.A.U 
summit in Mauritius in July 1976. To cap it all, Nwanolue and 
Iwuoha (85) write that after Murtala’s death, it took Angola three 
whole weeks to express their condolence over the death of their 
benefactor. “When eventually the message did arrive from Angola, 
only its first three sentences made any reference to our loss; the 
remainder contained another shopping list” (85).The embarrassing 
frustration and betrayals from the Angolans cannot be exhausted in 
this study. Often, Nigerians living in Angola are hunted like animals. 
Indeed, whatever we have done for them in the past meant little and 
presently means nothing to them.  
Nigeria’s African policy can thus be seen as a case of acting 
without thinking. How can a nation where half of the citizens were 
(are) living below the poverty line waste resources on gifts and 
grants to needy countries without thinking of benefits accruable to 
her. As students and scholars of international politics, we do know 
that there is no free diner, every supposedly altruistic favor has a 
strategic cum realist underpinning, which may be for the medium or 
long term. In the case of Angola discussed above, Joe Garba 
summarizes the point quite succinctly: 
 
In implementing this otherwise admirable policy, 
we let our enthusiasm for the MPLA’s success 
against its Western and South African backed 
rivals run away with us. As we have seen, the 
benefits to Nigeria as a result were no more than 
those that came to those countries who just sat 
back and watched. Stripped of emotional 
commitment, our working of the system of 
international relations in which the national 
interest is always in view and reciprocity is always 
a constant factor, we did not get high marks (37). 
 
He further queries: 
 




What, after all did Nigeria gain? High visibility in 
the international community; an awakening of our 
government officials as to what serious lobbying 
involved; and rallying a large percentage of our 
population to an international cause. But in 
bilateral terms which are, after all, the core- 
relation between states, we gave and gave to 
Angola, in return got nothing (37). 
 
It is not a fallacy for one to posit that there has been an apparent 
disconnect between Nigeria’s national interest and Nigeria’s Africa 
relations. For it is alarmingly glaring that Nigeria has done so much 
for the Africa continent without any commensurable and 
corresponding positive outcomes. In this regard, Inno Ukeje avers 
that “our false generosity abroad and penury at home are proof that 
we are pretending to be what we are not because in reality, we have 
been overstretching ourselves”(Ukeje, 25). One cannot but agree 
with this scholar of international relations. What is more, Nigeria’s 
Africa policy has even backfired to haunt Nigeria and Nigerians. 
Most African countries are wont to believe that Nigeria wants to use 
her vast demographic and natural resources to intimidate them 
thereby establishing unrivaled hegemony. Some African countries 
believe that Nigeria is a spent force whose citizens have had to leave 
their country to despoil other countries. This in turn has led to a 
wave of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians all over Africa. Most of 
these African countries erect wicked and harsh trade policies against 
Nigerians in their countries. The list is endless: Ghana, Angola, 
South Africa and the Congo etc. 
 
The Case of South Africa 
Unarguably, Nigeria’s relationship with South Africa is determined 
by several factors. Nonetheless, historical factors occupy the mode 
in the frequency of these factors. South Africa is a country, whose 
African people probably would still have been struggling to eke out 
a meager existence in the back waters of their own country, had 
Nigeria not emboldened herself and flexed her muscles to rescue 
fellow Africans, who were deluged with oppression and humiliation 
in the southernmost tip of the continent (Ugwunne, 34). Nigeria’s 
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efforts were crucial in the final triumph of South African against the 
obnoxious Apartheid behemoth. Joseph Garba’s book, Diplomatic 
Soldiering and a host of other literatures have amply underscored the 
multidimensional assistance of Nigeria to South Africa. It may be 
unwieldy to go through the abundant occasions in which Nigeria 
exerted herself enormously to ensure that South Africa gained 
independence. However, a few will suffice to explain the position of 
this present study. It is instructive to note that Nigeria’s 
engagements in South Africa were actuated by her Africanist values 
and interests. 
 Nigeria provided the fulcrum and a rallying point in the 
struggle against apartheid by mobilizing states that abhorred the evil 
practice to tighten international pressures against South Africa. 
Often, Nigeria went solo and engaged policies that could be inimical 
to her economic survival; she was indeed willing to endure all the 
negative darts thrown at her by the supporters of Apartheid. What is 
more, the struggle was to take a dramatic turn during the regime of 
Murtala/ Obasanjo, 1975- 1975; it was so momentous that domestic 
awareness was mounted to the extent that students of many tertiary 
institutions formed clubs like the Youth Solidarity on South Africa 
where these students contributed money from their pocket monies 
which they remitted to the South Africa Relief Fund (SARF) earlier 
created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More than $30 million 
was thus generated and transferred to the South African freedom 
fighters (Garba, 102). 
 Furthermore, the Murtala - Obasanjo regime, in a successful 
attempt to send warning signals, to the whole world, that it would 
not tolerate, nor flirt with any country doing business with the white 
minority regime in South Africa, nationalized the local operations of 
Barclays Bank in Nigeria, after that bank ignored the strong protests 
by Nigeria, advising it, not to buy the South African government 
bond, which would be in violation of the economic/trade embargo 
on the racist South African regime. Again, the regime nationalized 
the British Petroleum (BP) for supplying oil to South Africa and also 
for British prevarication on the Rhodesian question. This was at a 
time, when South Africa blacks needed action and not just the 
rhetoric to give momentum to the struggle for freedom from the 
white masters. These were no mean and easy decisions. These were 
decisions that carried very enormous political implications. These 




decisions were capable of attracting serious political, economic and 
social reprisals. However, “for the love of our brothers and sisters in 
South Africa, Nigeria risked all, to help South Africa gain freedom” 
(Lamido, 15). 
 Nigeria is also reputed to have provided secret military 
training at the Kaduna First Mechanized Amy Division and provided 
other material, financial and diplomatic support to the African 
National Congress guerrilla forces. In tandem with foregoing, 
Otubanjo (132) asks: “who can quantify the millions of dollars, that 
Nigeria spent on the A. N. C. during the struggle to liberate South 
Africa?”  
 Furthermore, to help South Africa gain independence, 
Nigeria led a boycott of the 1978 Games in protest of New Zealand's 
sporting contacts with Apartheid South Africa, and 32 of 59 nations 
from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean joined a Nigeria led boycott of 
the 1986 Commonwealth Games due to the Thatcher government's 
attitude towards South African. Nigeria, a member of the 
Commonwealth mobilized its diplomatic influence and led majority 
of the Commonwealth countries to boycott these Commonwealth 
games as a show of solidarity to South Africa and to send a message 
to the Apartheid supporters in Commonwealth and in the world 
generally, that Nigeria will fight with all, to ensure the independence 
of South Africa from the clutches of Apartheid. This by all 
indications was a herculean task. Nonetheless, it deeply tested 
Nigeria's claim to leadership in Africa and beyond. What is more, 
the mobilization was very successful; as the Commonwealth games, 
that year, was a sorry story. From that moment onwards, the whole 
world took notice and the struggle for the liberation of South Africa 
was immediately hyper-accelerated. Nigeria’s efforts and a host of 
other changes in the international system were to work singly and in 
combination; resulting in South Africa independence in 1994. 
 The real question begging for an urgent answer is: what 
actually has Nigeria gained by sticking her neck out in an Africanist-
value- orientated policy in South Africa? South Africans claim that 
Nigeria did not help South Africa but only the ANC. The 
foolhardiness in such a position is revealed when one is forced to 
ask: would South African independence have been possible outside 
the rugged and dogged nationalism of the ANC? The recent (2015) 
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xenophobic attacks against Nigerians and other black Africans in 
South Africa go to buttress the near uselessness of basing Nigeria’s 
I.R on African values and interests. In fact, it is not erroneous to 
argue that Nigeria’s Africanist assistance to South Africa has turned 
to haunt Nigeria. Ugwuja, Ibekilo and Ekesiobi contend that “it 
cannot be denied that South Africa has often leveraged on her 
position in these alliances (her selective cooperation with emerging 
economies) to frustrate Nigeria’s interests within and outside the 
African continent” (19).  
 
The Case of Ghana 
Nigeria’s bilateral relations with Ghana has revealed some 
dimensions portraying Nigeria’s African values and interests in 
international relations engagement as antithetical to her core national 
interests. Although, Nigeria cannot be said to have been a Santa 
Claus to Ghana, nonetheless Nigeria’s financial large – heartedness 
has in more than one occasion benefited Ghana immensely. Recall 
that for years, until quite recently Nigeria supplied Ghana with a 
consequential amount of its energy resources, especially petroleum. 
Indeed, before 1997, Ghana was known to owe Nigeria 
tremendously. Some of the debt were written off and out rightly 
cancelled. But what has Nigeria gained from all these? Nothing 
significant; except insulting remarks about Nigeria from Ghana, its 
rulers and masses inclusive; a Ghanaian high – ranking leader was 
known to have referred to Nigeria as “a lame giant”.  
 Furthermore, the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in 
Ghana has ossified their disdain for Nigeria. The Ghanaian ministry 
of trade and commerce has gone to the extent of erecting trade 
barriers against Nigerian traders doing business in their country and 
often Nigerian citizens, especially, traders are treated with levity. 
The effect of these for Nigeria’s citizens and international relations 
is that of country whose citizens are scarcely proud of her 
achievements. And since external image is undeniably crucial in I.R, 
Nigeria continues to a project an image of careless and excessive 
emotional people. This does the country no good in the seeming 
squalid game of I.R. Therefore, something has to be done about 
these problems and urgently, too. The next and final section 
discusses the remedies for these ills in Nigeria’s I.R. 
 




Conclusion and Recommendations 
Nigeria’s international relations contrived on the basis of African 
values and interests were born of historical circumstances and that 
foreign policy thrust appeared to have served some purpose when it 
did but does not appear to continue to do so in today’s international 
realities. There is therefore, a pressing need to overhaul and reinvent 
not only the foreign policy processes of the country but also to 
dismantle its philosophical foundations. 
In line with the above, this study recommends the re-
creation, elaboration and expansion of the objectives of Nigeria’s 
I.R. As L.A Jinadu has argued, there is no tinge of critical 
philosophy in Nigeria’s foreign policy (17). Secondly, this study 
canvasses the need for a ‘new economic diplomacy’ in Nigeria’s 
foreign policy. In this new I.R posture, Nigeria should craft and 
deploy policies which should aim at making Angola and South 
Africa pay reciprocate for the numerous assistance rendered to them 
which has become objects of scorn and derision by these countries. 
Nigeria, for example can employ aggressive economic diplomacy in 
its bilateral relations with South Africa; at least partial or full 
nationalization of their top investments in Nigeria would send the 
right signals and teach South Africans to treat Nigerians more 
humanely. The fledging businesses owned by Nigerians and quoted 
in the South African Stock Market should not foreclose the above 
objective, the gains of nationalizing the South African owned MTN 
alone can compensate for whatever retaliatory economic measures 
that may be put up by South Africa. 
Since I.R has an undeniable nexus with domestic affairs, 
Nigeria should endeavor to forestall the teething signposts of a 
failing state such as insecurity, ethnicity, religious bigotry, intra and 
inter regional acrimonies, corruption and moral decadence and lack 
of sincere leadership.Nigeria’s I.R should be made more global; as 
indeed mutual bilateral relationships should be developed with the 
emerging nations of Asia and South America. Finally, all 
appointments to Nigeria foreign missions and employments should 
be based on purely technical expertise instead of overt political 
considerations. 
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